Background and Problem
One can scarcely maintain that the practice of sociology as an empirical science could not be open to improvement. The inquiry into possi bilities for improvement leads to questions con cerning the method practised, and to the ques tion as to whether there is a more fruitful alter native. In recent years ALBERT has worked out very clearly the difference between the classi cal pre-Popperian methodology and the modern Popperian critical-rationalistic methodology. In his analysis the preferability of the latter emerged (ALBERT 1968: 8-54) . As the classical metho dology in empirical sociology, or the tradition of empirical social research, does not appear to be without adherents, an attempt will be made here to contribute to the diffusion of the critical-rationalistic methodology.
In classical methodology, truth and certainty are regarded as the two goals of science, i.e. as the regulative ideas which control the oper ation of a system of scientific statements. It is then taken for granted that the quest for certainty is compatible with the search for truth. On closer inspection however, it appears that this compatibility is only realisable if one limits oneself to drafting statements lacking in content and which therefore furnish no information about reality. to criticism, and would not be worth the effort of criticising in any case. Under this limitation, certainty is bought at too high a price. It be comes desirable to develop a new programme for science, one in which the desire to say some thing about reality is introduced in the form of a regulative idea. In POPPER'S critical-ration alistic programme of science, content is explicit ly introduced, truth retained, and certainty dropped as a regulative idea.
A scientific researcher who behaves in accord ance with the classical principle of sufficient reason, the principle of positive justification, searches for ultimate grounds, works with "authoritative sources of knowledge", and only makes "founded" statements which he can "justify" or "legitimate" . The only way he can consistently apply this principle is by employ ing practices that render criticism difficult if not impossible. Such practices imply that con tent is abandoned as a regulative idea. A research er who acts in accordance with the principle of the critical-rationalistic method, the principle of subjection to critical tests, will draft and opt for statements open to criticism. He will also employ such practices that increase, rather than obstruct, the opportunities for criticism.
One of the most important tasks in furthering the practice of sociology, is to list and describe practices which obstruct criticism and to indicate their usage in sociological literature. The effec tiveness of carrying out this task will be en hanced by focusing on cases which bear closely upon the problems central to contemporary empirical sociology. It is in this sense regrettable that POPPER focused on "conventionalist strategems" in physics, psycho-analysis and the poli tically orientated strands of Marxism, TOPITSCH on "empty formulae that say neither anything specific nor new about reality" in traditional metaphysics and social philosophy, and ALBERT on "immunisation-strategems" in neo-classical economics and theology. For it may be presumed that the analyses of such cases will be miscon strued by empirical sociologists, or else be met with a shrug of the shoulder. It will also be effective to analyse cases in sociological literature where practices harmful to criticism are not employed. An attempt will be made to list such practices, and to point out instances of their usage or explicit avoidance. It should be noted that this list of "immunisation-strategies" makes no claim to be anything like a complete typology of practices obstructing criticism.
The Escape into Tautologies
The situation in which a piece of research leads to the refutation of previously accepted state ments without the availability of alternative explanations, is one which is unacceptable to those who adhere to the empiristic version of the classical justificationist methodology (ALBERT 1968: 21-28 ). In the literature of the tradition of empirical social research, immunisation prac tices are especially to be expected in the closing argumentation of research publications that in volve results unfavourable to the initial central hypotheses. One of the ways in which attempts are made to avoid this situation of "being left empty-handed" is the escape into tautologies which we will now try to point out in a wellknown book by BENDIX and LIPSET, entitled Social Mobility in Industrial Society (1959) .
The problem posed in this book was one of the most urgent ones within the Marxist explanatory programme. According to Marxist theory, it was impossible that in capitalistic countries (countries in which the economy is controlled by the mar ket-mechanism) there should not emerge so cialist parties (political parties which endeavour to replace the market-mechanism by an organisation-machanism The authors may leave the reader to theoretical ly account for this refutation; then again, they may attempt to do so themselves. BENDIX and LIPSET do not propose a new hypothesis con cerning the conditions of the emergence of socialist political parties. However, the last sentence of the book notes that it needs be recognized that "a high rate of social and labor mobility is a concomitant of industrialization regardless of political conditions". The authors appear to regard this statement as the most im portant theoretical modification to issue from their research. This new statement we find for mulated as follows only a few pages earlier on in the book:
"Our findings support the thesis that social mobility is an integral and continuing aspect o f the processes of urbanization, industrialization and bureaucratiza tion" (BENDIX and LIPSET 1959: 280).
Let us examine this statement closely. At the outset it is clear that the statement no longer relates to SOMBART's problem. But furthermore, the content of the statement is peculiar. For variables such as "social mobility" and "degree of industrialization" (urbanization, bureaucrati-zation)" are usually1 defined in relation to each other, rather than independently. Thus an in crease in a country's degree of industrialization logically implies a certain degree of social mo bility (more people moving from primary to secondary industry, and more moving into the tertiary sector). If we take a social mobility matrix as our point of departure (see figure 1) , we see that the marginal frequencies expressed in percentages indicate a country's degree of industrialization at two different points in time.
group of researchers round LAZARSFELD looked at the history of empirical social research. In a resently published collection of essays, COLE, one of the group's members, states:
"Thus far we have seen how there was a great deal of empirical research done in the nineteenth century. Some o f this work, particularly that of the midcen tury criminologists, was relatively sophisticated. Yet this tradition never lead to the development o f an empirical sociology -it was a dead end. The question we must answer is why did continuity fail? It is my hypothesis that continuity is difficult to maintain A change in these percentages (an increase in the degree of industrialization) is logically pos sible only when the cell-entries for socially mo bile people (righthand-upper, and lefthand-lower corner) are not equal to zero. It thus appears that the statement is analytic: it is a statement in which one predicate is incorporated in anoth er and therefore certainly true, but lacking in content. Every logically possible finding would support the thesis: none is possible that would contradict it.
Digression: Where tautologizing is attempted, concepts with a very dubious function may start to appear in the argument. We shall look into this here.
In the United States, various projects are being carried out in the sociology of science. Thus, a A few remarks concerning this "Exhaustionsmethode" , which was described and highly valued by the German epistemologist DINGLER.
The method advocated by DINGLER needs to be viewed explicitly within the framework of classical methodology which looks upon truth and certainty as the regulative ideas; the me thod of exhausting is then a way of arriving at certain truth. DINGLER exemplifies his method using MENDEL'S biological laws. If we have two parents who are similar in all charact eristics save one, and we designate them with mm and m'nT, then an ensuing generation will be as follows; mm: 25%, mm': 25%, m'm: 25% and m'm': 25%. DINGLER continues (our trans lation):
"If we then call a pair of parental characteristics, which behaves in this way »independent4, we have the pro position: independent pairs of parental characteristics behave according to the afore-mentioned Mendelian law. This proposition is of course a tautology but, as we have seen, only these have apodictic certainty44 (DINGLER 1923: 322).
And furthermore:
"Now we no longer turn to nature to »experimentally prove4 Mendel's law, but we examine the single case and depending on whether it behaves according to the law, we call the specific pair of characteristics inde pendent or not44 (DINGLER 1923: 322).
The concept of "independent characteristics" clearly functions paradigmatically here: research programmes can be designed to check whether or not particular characteristics of certain ani mals or plants are independent ones. In the course of such research however, MENDEL'S laws are not once tested.
Take the following hypothesis: "For all charact eristics and all living beings it can be said that, if two parents are similar in all respects save one, and the one parent is designated mm while the other m'm', then an ensuing second generat ion would have a frequency distribution with respect to the possible characteristic combina tions of 25%-25%-25%-25%". Any potential refutation of that hypothesis can be compen sated for by introducing the concept of "in dependent characteristics", while the frequen cy distribution is also used to determine whether a particular characteristic is independent or not. DINGLER opts for tautologies. From the tacitly accepted hypothesis, which has been formulated as generally as possible, DINGLER draws infor mation concerning one particular species and one particular characteristic. Should the supplied information appear to be untrue, he acts as if the information was not derived from the state ment. The introduction of the concept of "in dependent characteristics" resulted in the attenu ation of the refutation of a hypothesis with a particularly high empirical content, and in the main tenance of the illusion of being in possession of certain truths. Had neither refutation been valued negatively nor the concept of "indepen dent characteristics" been introduced, exactly the same piece of research could yet have been carried out. After all, one can design a research programme with the aim of finding out whether a statement supplies true information for all species and all characteristics.
We can now look at the function played by the concept of institutionalization in COLE'S argu ment. This function appears to be limited in as much as the desired analysis of a correlationmatrix could well be carried out without the introduction of the concept of institutionali zation. Instead, the concept's function is to enable zero-correlations (i. e. refutations of hy potheses) to be disposed of easily, just as DINGLER was able to dismiss false predictions by claiming that not independent but dependent variables were involved: for when one carries out an item-analysis of indicators for a parti cular concept, it is accepted procedure to re move an item which correlates badly with the others and to consider the item concerned as simply an inadequate indicator of the particular concept. COLE assumes that both a common journal and a scientific society are ways of in stitutionalizing the scientists' interactions (COLE 1972: 117-8) . But should it appear that a com mon journal, unlike a scientific society, does not lead to a greater co-ordination of scientific acti vity, then he can easily claim that the hypo thesis "if institutionalization, then continuity" , has not been refuted, but that a journal is an inadequate indicator of institutionalization. Should he adopt this course of action, he would be applying the method of exhausting. In general: one needs to keep in mind that the escape into tautologies can be accompanied by the introduc tion of concepts that fulfil a dubious function.
Ad hoc Introduction of Auxiliary Hypotheses

A different immunisation-strategy is the practice o f introducing ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses.
This strategy accommodates refutational fin dings of a theory's principal hypotheses in the following way. The auxiliary hypotheses are introduced in order to explain away the empirical findings. These auxiliary hypotheses themselves, however, are not subjected to that scrutiny which normally befalls newly intro duced hypotheses. Such scutiny of hypotheses concerns their empirical content, the degree to which they have survived empirical testing and the desirability of empirical research into their truthfulness. The introduction of auxiliary hy potheses creates several possibilities for immu nisation.
First, the empirical content of the auxiliary hypotheses may be zero, or indeterminate, as a result of which the whole theory becomes immunised. This is a case of objectively rende ring criticism impossible.
Second, the empirical content (of the auxiliary hypotheses) though positive may be such as to allow only of an alternative explanation for the refutational results. One could, however, have opted for a different theoretical modification which offers more scope for criticism by pos ing an alternative explanation for the confirm ing results as well. This is a case of objectively rendering criticism difficult.
Third, the author may construct his argument in such a way that while there could be no objections to the content of the auxiliary hy potheses as such, the modified theory is presen ted as having the same empirical content as the original theory. This down-grading of the theo retical modification reduces attention to the question of the desirability of further research into the truth of the modified theory: if two theories have the same empirical content and one has already been tested, then there is less urgency about subjecting the other to any tests. This is a case of pragmatically rendering cri ticism difficult, as the statements of the modi fied theory are quite acceptable in themselves. Other researchers will simply be less inclined to carry out tests because of their apparent superfluousness. The way to avoid immunization and, instead, allow for a theoretically progressive solution of the problem, is to maximize the content of the modified theory and to recog nize the desirability of empirically testing that theory.
We shall now try to indicate the use of the first two of the above-mentioned varieties of this strategy in a section of DAHRENDORF's Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1959) . This part of DAHRENDORF's theory was em pirically tested by LOPREATO, whose findings will be referred to here.
DAHRENDORF aims to develop a theoretical al ternative to existent theories that offer an ex planation as to why some members of a society have interests which are opposed to those of other members. First he holds that two social classes need be distinguished within a society which he conceives of as an "imperatively co ordinated association" ; a Command Class, whose members participate in authority, and an Obey Class, whose members are subjected to the exer cise of authority. Second he holds that the parti cipation in, or subjection to, authority explains the phenomenon of the opposition of interests. On the one hand DAHRENDORF opposes the WARNERian stratification theories, according to which several classes need to be distinguished in order to explain the opposition o f interests.
On the other hand, he stands opposed to Marx ist theories which see the source of explanation to lie in the possession of, or exclusion from, the means of production. DAHRENDORF also describes exactly who belongs to which class. He notes emphatically that for the purpose of explaining the opposition of interests, the powerful class needs to be larger than it is in the light of elite-theories ä la PARETO or MOSCA.
The question is whether and how DAHRENDORF's alternative to the extant theories can be tested. LOPREATO (1968) attempted to do so and found most of the predictions to be at odds with the research-findings, using test-scores abtained via a national survey. It appears that DAHRENDORF uses an auxiliary hypothesis here; one which specifies which in terests are manifest in certain circumstances, and which latent in others. Unless hypotheses clearly specifying the relevant circumstances are explicitly formulated, the informative content of the auxiliary hypotheses, and therefore of the whole theory, is indeterminate. Every un favourable test-result can be explained away at will. It can simply be argued that the cir cumstances were such that the interests were latent, as was "shown" by the results.
Let us see whether DAHRENDORF advances informative auxiliary hypotheses. He states: This specification of relevant conditions appears unproblematic with the possible exception of the last-mentioned variable, "internalisation of role interests", which might render the state ment uninformative. What matters here is whe ther DAHRENDORF regards every independent variable as a necessary pre-condition: if so, then one weak link renders the whole chain useless.
On the other hand, if he regards them as simple conditions, then it is quite possible to drop one of them without impairing the content of that particular part of the statement. However, DAHRENDORF's auxiliary hypotheses do not simply amount to a specification of relevant conditions, but moreover to a revision of the concept of "interests". For the auxiliary hypo theses to be falsifiable, it is necessary that the three types of interest (present manifest, pre sent latent and absent) can be empirically dis tinguished from one another. DAHRENDORF describes interests as follows: Such a description of latent interests is so vague that it is not only the ill-disposed researcher who can interpret nearly every absent interest as a latent one. Furthermore, it is striking that no description is given of absent interests; such a description is desirable in view of the empi rical testing of the auxiliary hypotheses. Auxiliary hypotheses with a content appropriate to that aim have not been included in DAHREN DORF's theory, so that on that count, as well, the theory exhibits immunization tendencies.
The Reluctance to Refute Renowned Thinkers
The immunization-practice that we shall deal with now could perhaps be termed the reluct ance to admit refutations where the theories o f renowned men are concerned. This practice may perhaps be regarded as a specific case of the third variety of the above mentioned ad hoc strategies involving auxiliary hypotheses. But in a more general formulation, this practice can be distinguished in its own right: for one may alter central hypotheses without explicitly indicating such modification.
A scientific community will usually be found to recognize some persons as having produced singularly commendable work. When a scien tist attacks the theories of one these renowned thinkers, his action is sure to be frowned upon. This will happen particularly among those who adhere to the classical methodology and who see in refutations the stalemate of science: after all, it then appears that an attack is made upon the "authoritative sources of knowledge" . In this way, there may emerge within the scienti fic community a certain miss-placed deference with respect to the empirical testing of these generally respected theories. Instead of con cluding that the theory of a particular prominent person is incorrect, there will be a tendency to see the theory as having been "improved upon", or "elaborated" . This immunization-practice involves the surrender of content as a regulative idea, for by means of it, the difference in con tent between theories is passed over. Now it may very well be that, as the authors themselves hold, if one hypothesis is removed from MICHELS' theory, "that" theory can ex plain the evolution of the particular trade-union studied. But to act as if both theories convey the same information implies the abandonment of content as a regulative idea and can only hinder the growth of knowledge.
The Retreat into Essentialism and the ad hoc Modification of Definitions
To the list of immunization-practices belongs also the retreat into essentialism, which can be regarded as a special case of the ad hoc mo dification o f definitions. The retreat into essen tialism entails operating with the notion of "essence" in order to save a hypothesis in the face of refutational results. A nomological hypothesis does not insist upon, but prohibits the existence of certain states of affairs. Now, when a hypothesis has been refuted,one can argue that what was held to be impossible (and now apparently is not), is really so, because that which has been shown to be possible is not essential to it.
Such reasoning is especially common to Marx ist theories, which posited a large number of hypotheses about matters that were held to be impossible within the structure of a market-re gulated economic system. When the course of development of capitalism over the last century showed that a large number of these matters could in fact take place (and particularly alter ations in what had been designated the most deplorable facets of the systems), different as pects that hat previously been neglected were now brought to the fore; these were now re garded as the system's essential characteristics while other aspects were suddenly termed ines sential.
ENGELS ranks among those who used empirical social research findings to demonstrate the thesis that the operation of the "invisible hand" of the market-mechanism did not always increase the "wealth of nations" in such a way that the great est happiness would befall the greatest number of people. Within Marxism, an opposing thesis gained a prominent place: it was predicted that the state of wretchedness and size of the class lacking access to the means of production would increase. Yet this thesis too failed to withstand the test of time. History has shown that a system in which the economy is regulated by a market-me chanism, is not incompatible with a system in which the welfare of those who do not possess the means of production increases.
Some important aspects are revealed by logically analysing the 1892 Preface to the English Edition to ENGELS' Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in
England, nach eigener Anschauung und authen tischen Quellen, which was originally published in 1845. While in 1845 the book confidently re futes the optimistic capitalist thesis with the use of varous figures, the situation has become dif ferent by 1892. History had discredited the pessimistic version of the thesis that ENGELS had adhered to in his book, so that the refutatio nal evidence needs to be taken into account. ENGELS however does not advance a progressive modification of his original theory. Instead he attempts to maintain it by obscuring the refuta tions with the notion of "essence" . We quote from the 1892 Preface, the emphasis each time being ours: ENGELS had in 1845 insisted upon certain issues. They were issues that he had tried to unmask with the use of empirical findings and which we may assume he regarded as being of prime im portance (who after all emphasizes secundary matters). By 1892, however, those issues had become fortuitous, and thus apparently even a decrease in the death-and illness-rates no longer indicated a real amelioration but, on the contrary a further deterioration in conditions. ENGELS' theory had been refuted and he tried to preserve it by means of essentialistic arguments which immunise the theory by designating at will for merly crucial facets as secondary ones. One can also say that ENGELS had changed from one theory about certain systemic characteristics to another theory involving different charact eristics. He then tried to make the change plausible with essentialistic arguments, there by obscuring the ad hoc modifications of the therory's concepts (in ENGELS' case: increasing misery).
We shall attempt to indicate a more obvious instance of this immunization-practice of alter ing definitions in an ad hoc manner, in discus sing an important theory of C. W. MILLS.
In 19462 MILLS proposed a set of hypotheses in order to be able to predict that "civic welfare" would be less in cities in which a large number of small firms provide most of the employment opportunities, than in "big business cities" , in which a small number of large firms provide most of those opportunities. "Civic welfare" of "community welfare" denoted such matters as child-mortality rate, average income, housing conditions, public expenditure on recreation etc. Three pairs of cities were careful selected as research-units. The results were as predicted.
IRVING FOWLER carried out a replication of MILLS' study, using thirty cities in the state of New York and broadening the operationalization of the con cept "civic welfare" to include more variables than MILLS had used. FOWLER published his re sults in an award-winning article (1958) , in which he showed that his empirical findings were unlike those of MILLS. According to the principle of subjection to critical tests, it should then be acknowledged that MILLS' theory (as it stands) has been falsified and that a modified theory, which is better able to explain civic welfare, should be proposed. GOLDSEN, who belonged to MILLS' circle, wrote an article for the 1964 book dedicated to the memory of MILLS. In stead of exploring the modified theory proposed by FOWLER, she poses an essentialistic question: GOLDSEN here rejects the usual interpretations (also accepted by MILLS himself) of the term "civic welfare" in an ad hoc manner, and rede fines the term by introducing new variables that were not previously considered to be of any importance to the operationalization of MILLS' concept (otherwise he himself would surely have included them, and moreover, would have left out some that he did include). As the concept "civic welfare" is changed in content, so is the hypothesis which incorporates that concept3 * . Also, it has been overlooked that the tested statement was derived from a theory which tried to explain why civic welfare would be more extensive in "small business cities" than in "big business" ones. Even if what has been suggested about the "more elusive aspects" should withstand critical testing then the theory is still at fault. The question as to what is wrong with the theory is merely obscured and not con sidered by altering the usage of terms after a re futation has been presented. By brushing over the differences in content between theories, con tent as a regulative idea is abandoned and the criticism of statements rendered more difficult. 
Immunization and the Assumption under lying the Measuring Techniques
Our point of departure in this section is the oft-forgotten proposition that a single, isolated, hypothesis is logically falsifiable, but can never be falsified in practice4. The reason is simply that empirical research must necessarily involve more than one hypothesis. Every test is carried out with certain measuring techniques, and no matter how simple such techniques may appear, they always presume other theories than the one explicitly being tested. (Thus, the survey-ques tion "which political party did you vote for at the last election" relies on the truth of hypo theses such as "if people are asked which party they voted for at the last election, and if they voted for the Socialist Party, then they will reply that they voted for the Socialist Party"). Now, when an unpredicted result turns up in empirical research, the refutation can be ascribed to two distinct sources:
(1) the falsity of the hypothesis which is the ,raison d'etre4 of the research, the research hypothesis;
(2) the falsity of the hypotheses underlying the measuring techniques used, i.e., in research terminology, the invalidity of the measuring instruments.
Unexpected test-results only imply that "some thing is wrong somewhere", without indicating "what" or "where".
When a refutation is ascribed to the research hypothesis without much further ado, one de monstrates an excessive faith in data and, as a result, immunizes the often implicit observa tional theories underlying the measuring techni ques. When, on the other hand, one simply ascribes the refutation to the observational theories, one demonstrates a pious faith in the theories to be tested, and immunizes those theories. In both cases one acts on the assump tion of the certainty of one particular hypothe sis, and when a refutation is obtained, one only proposes hypotheses with a particular content as theoretical alternatives. In the first case one never proposes new hypotheses referring to the measuring techniques, while in the second case one always proposes nothing but hypo theses referring to the measuring techniques. This practice implies the abandonment of con tent as a regulative idea. For should that idea be taken seriously, the consideration of theo retical alternatives can not limit itself at the very outset to theories with a particular con tent. We shall now look at a case in which one of these immunization-practices was not resorted to.
Within the framework of a research programme designed to explain the diffusion of innovations within social systems, COLEMAN, KATZ and MENZEL (1966) was scarcely possible. The international congres ses that were supposed to bring about some measure of coordination had failed, while the work of the "Bureau Internationale de Statistique" had only just commenced. In those cir cumstances it could do no harm to insist upon improvements in data before possibly abandon ing hypotheses that were at odds with the avai lable statistics. Retaining one's hypotheses is then the only way to further the improvement of statistical records, which in turn would lead to improved hypotheses.
Digression: some remarks on a way of immu nising hypotheses which do not express mono tonic relationships.
It seems possible to translate DURKHElM's sui cide theory into two mathematical functions.
The independent variable in the first relation ship (figure 2) is the degree of integration of an individual into some group, while in the second relationship ( figure 3) , it is the number of group norms that are operative for an indi vidual. The dependent variable is in both cases the suicide-rate. Neither function specifies a montonic relationship as do most hypotheses in sociology. Instead, both functions are para bolic.
Looking at the first function: on the left side of the parabola is the egoistic type of suicide (the individual's intergration is insufficient), while on the right side we have the altruistic . The empirical testing of such parabolic functions requires far more precise measuring techniques than is generally the case for monotonic funct ions. For one needs to be able to situate any score obtained: i.e. one needs a measuring tech nique which will determine whether an indi vidual's score is above or below either the maxi mum or the minimum of the relevant function. Lacking such a measuring technique, the follow ing possibilities can not be avoided:
(1) a negative result for the egoistic theory can be transformed into a corroborative result for the altruistic theory;
(2) a negative result for the altruistic theory can be transformed into a corroborative result for the egoistic theory;
(3) a negative result for the anomic theory can be transformed into a corroborative result for the fatalistic theory;
(4) a negative result for the fatalistic theory can be transformed into a corroborative result for the anomic theory.
The following holds for monotonic functions: for every value of the independent variable it can be said that, if one individual scores higher on the in dependent variable than another individual, then the first individual will never score lower on the depen dent variable than the second individual (or vice versa in the case of a negative monotonic rela tionship). Thus, in order to test the relevant statement, no other information is needed apart from the particular statement "this individual scores higher (or lower) on the independent variable than that individual" . In the case of such "U-shaped" curves as we are concerned with here, however, the following holds:
(1) for every value of the independent variable below a certain score, it can be said that, if one individual scores higher on the indepen dent variable than another individual, the first individual will score lower on the dependent variable;
(2) for every value of the independent variable above that certain score it can be said that, if one individual scores higher on the indepen dent variable than another individual, the first individual will score higher on the dependent variable.
Such parabolic functions require a certain pre cision of measuring technique. Otherwise, and not withstanding their falsifiability and content, such functions are immune to critical examina tion. Such theories will always survive empirical tests, should one want them to survive.
It appears then that DÜRKHEIM, who certainly did not have more precise measuring techniques at his disposal, has constructed his argument such that the inherent difficulty in testing non monotonic funtions is allowed to remain un noticed. The book gives the impression that his theory contains not two but four functions. By treating egoistic suicide separate from alt ruistic suicide in another chapter, and by dis posing of fatalistic suicide in a footnote, each parabola is exactly bisected (see the dotted lines in figures 3 and 4) , thus giving the im pression that DURKHEIM's theory contains four independently co-existent monotonic functions which do not require more precise measuring techniques for their empirical testing.
Finally: a critical-rationalist, confronted by such a situation, need not claim that such a theory is always "sustained" at will and leave it at that Rather, he will advocate that:
(1) it is in the interest of the growth of know ledge that measuring techniques of greater preci sion be developed which will remove the theo ry's practical immunity vis-ä-vis reality;
(2) failing such developments, that one should regard the question as to the truth of theories expressing non-monotonic relationships, as pre mature.
Conclusion: the Different Ways of Abandon ing Content as a Regulative Idea
It has already been pointed out that immuni zation-practices which operate by virtue of aban doning content as a regulative idea, do not ne cessarily involve statements lacking in content. The escape into tautologies is only one of seve ral examples. The list of immunization-practices is not completed by the addition of the prac tice of using auxiliary hypotheses of indetermi nate content. It is certainly possible that an author puts forward only statements that do have content and still obstructs criticism. Such is the case when opportunities to increase the content of theoretical alternatives are systemmatically neglected, or when out of two pos sible alternatives only one is adopted without any attempt at arguing the choice.
But even then the list of immunization-practices gives a one-sided impression, because criticism may be obstructed not only through the state ments themselves, but also through the attitudes attached to statements. One can obscure a dif ference in content between two statements and pass them off as conveying the same informa tion. One can likewise obscure a change in con tent by surreptitiously altering definitions when statements are confronted with unexpected empirical findings.
SCHMID published an article in 1972 dealing with ad hoc practices in empirical social research.
He looks at the situation where one has come to a contradiction between a prediction and a research-finding; a contradiction moreover that cannot be ascribed to the observational theory. SCHMID then distinguishes three ad hoc pract ices which can be utilised to resolve the con tradiction. One such practice he rejects because it involves the use of hypotheses lacking in con tent. The other two practices, however, he does not reject since they employ only informative and falsifiable hypotheses. Let us briefly exa mine these last two practices.
An explanatory theory consists of several "le vels" of hypotheses differing in content, con nected by auxiliary hypotheses. One practice now is to attempt to theoretically resolve the contradiction by replacing one of the auxiliary hypotheses and leaving the highest-level hypo thesis untouched. SCHMID fails to find fault with this practice on condition that the new auxiliary hypotheses be also informative. How ever, we would stress firstly that as a result of such a replacement, a new theory is put for ward with all the consequences thereof. Theories differing in content must not be passed off as being identical, and hence the new theory needs to be independently tested. We would further more stress that while the proposed theoretical resolution is progressive, a more progressive resolution yet is possible. For one can opt for a strategy of theoretical pluralism by conside ring a replacement of the highest-level hypo thesis as well as that of an auxiliary hypothesis. Faced with the question "must the contradict ion be resolved by altering the highest-level hy pothesis or one (or more) of the auxiliary ones?* the answer that maximizes the possibility of theoretical progress is "by concurrent attempts to do both" ! The other practice that SCHMID condones is that of attaching to a given hypothesis a new one which can account for deviations by spe cifying some additional factor. SCHMID argues the progressiveness of this step in terms of the possible development of the new hypothe sis; it may grow into an independent hypothe sis, which has more explanatory power than the old one. But again we would stress that the content of the old hypothesis is altered by the attachment of a novel specification. Con versely, we fail to see why the extended hypo thesis should not immediately be put forward as an independently formulated hypothesis. In the latter case, the hypothesis is more easily falsiflable and a clearer alternative to which other hypotheses may be compared.
It is, strictly speaking, correct to say that these practices as described by SCHMID do not render criticism impossible. But the usage of hypotheses lacking in content is not the only way to ob struct criticism, and it would appear that in the last two cases distinguished by SCHMID the available opportunities for increasing the scope of criticism are not fully utilised. It needs em phasis that a researcher can evoke certain atti tudes towards statements by presenting them in a certain manner. One can act as if a differ ence in content between two statements does not exist, and one can act as if theoretical modi fications are of little or no significance. But one then fails to proceed as one should if content as a regulative idea is accepted. For example, one must acknowledge that a theory with a different content must be subjected to a dif ferent empirical tests. Further, one must pose the question whether the new theory is true and ask how that theory may be subjected to em pirical test. The growth of knowledge is ob structed not only by working with hypotheses lacking in content, as is most frequently empha sized, but also by the refusal to make such ack nowledgements and to pose these crucial ques tions. There are several ways of abandoning content as a regulative idea, and it is hoped that this article has pointed toward some of the less frequently mentioned ones.
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